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“Right Divided, a Disciplined Left Steered the Supreme Court”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 30, 2015
The stunning series of liberal decisions
delivered by the Supreme Court this term was
the product of discipline on the left side of the
court and disarray on the right.
In case after case, including blockbusters on
same-sex marriage and President Obama’s
health care law, the court’s four-member
liberal wing, all appointed by Democratic
presidents, managed to pick off one or more
votes from the court’s five conservative
justices, all appointed by Republicans.
They did this in large part through rigorous
bloc voting, making the term that concluded
Monday the most liberal one since the
Warren court in the late 1960s, according to
two political-science measurements of court
voting data.
“The most interesting thing about this term is
the acceleration of a long-term trend of
disagreement among the Republicanappointed judges, while the Democraticappointed judges continue to march in lock
step,” said Eric Posner, a law professor at the
University of Chicago.
Many analysts credit the leadership of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the senior member of
the liberal justices, for leveraging their four
votes. “We have made a concerted effort to
speak with one voice in important cases,” she
said in an interview last year.

The court’s conservatives, by contrast, were
often splintered, issuing separate opinions
even when they agreed on the outcome. The
conservative justices, for instance, produced
more than 40 dissenting opinions, the liberals
just 13.
The divisions on the right, Professor Posner
said, may have occurred in part because the
mix of cases reaching the court has invited a
backlash. “Conservative litigators who hope
to move the law to the right by bringing cases
to the Supreme Court have overreached,” he
said. “They are trying to move the law farther
right than Kennedy or Roberts think
reasonable.”
For example, in King v. Burwell, the case
brought by groups hostile to the Affordable
Care Act, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the
court’s four liberals in rejecting the challenge
to health insurance subsidies provided
through federal exchanges. Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A.
Alito Jr. dissented.
In addition, Professor Posner said, the
conservative justices are airing real
jurisprudential disagreements. “Kennedy,
Roberts and Alito’s pragmatism contrasts
with the formalism of Scalia and Thomas, for
example,” he said.
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Lee Epstein, a law professor and political
scientist at Washington University in St.
Louis, said: “The Republicans can’t seem to
agree even when they agree.” She added that
“the chief justice has a much tougher task”
than Justice Ginsburg does.

When the administration ended up on the
losing side, it was often because it took a
conservative position, particularly in criminal
cases, said Adam Winkler, a law professor at
the University of California, Los Angeles.

David A. Strauss, a law professor at the
University of Chicago, said the cases the
court agreed to hear this past term might have
created a misperception about how liberal it
has become. “It’s still a conservative court —
just not as conservative as some had hoped
and some had feared,” he said. “King might
never even have been brought if the court, or
at least some justices, had not given signals
that they were receptive to claims like that.”

“The administration most often lost the court
because it couldn’t hold the liberals,”
Professor
Winkler
said.
“The
administration’s positions in the Supreme
Court were too conservative. Shockingly, the
Supreme Court may have been more liberal
than the Obama administration this term.”
This was so, he said, in cases involving drugs,
guns, searches and threats posted on
Facebook.

The term was not uniformly liberal, of
course. On Monday alone, the court ruled
against death row inmates in a case on lethal
injections and against the Obama
administration in a case on environmental
regulations.

When the four liberal members of the court
— Justices Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer,
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan —
achieved a majority, they were often happy to
let others do the talking.
“I was struck by the discipline of the liberal
wing — both in sticking together and in
suppressing the urge any of them may have
felt to write separately,” said Michael Dorf, a
law professor at Cornell. This produced
strong and united opinions, he said, from
Justice Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges, the
same-sex marriage case, and from Chief
Justice Roberts in the health care case.

Nor is the court remotely as liberal as the
Warren court, which issued a far greater
percentage of liberal decisions, often
unanimously,
in
cases
on
school
desegregation, interracial marriage, voting
rights and criminal procedure.
The Obama administration, though, found an
unlikely ally in the court in major cases, said
Pratik A. Shah, a lawyer with Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld. “Not many imagined a
few years ago,” Mr. Shah said, “that this
court, rather than Congress, would become
the more effective venue for furthering the
administration’s priorities.”

Dissenting in Obergefell, Justice Scalia
accused the court’s liberals of a sort of
intellectual dishonesty in joining Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, which he charged
sacrificed legal rigor for soaring language.
“If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth
vote, I ever joined an opinion for the court”
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that included such vague passages, he wrote,
quoting one, “I would hide my head in a bag.”
Justice Kennedy, the member of the court at
its ideological center, did his part in moving
the court to the left. As usual, he was in the
majority in most of the 19 decisions decided
by 5-to-4 votes.
Thirteen of those rulings split along the usual
lines, with Justice Kennedy joining either the
court’s four more liberal members or its four
more conservative ones. In previous terms,
he leaned right in such cases about two-thirds
of the time. This time around, he voted with
the liberals eight times and with the
conservatives five.
In major cases, the court seemed to capture
the spirit of the time, notably in establishing
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage as
a majority of Americans came to embrace it.
Justice Ginsburg seemed to anticipate and
explain the ruling in recent remarks at the
American Constitution Society, a liberal
legal group. “The court is not in a popularity
contest, and it should never be influenced by
today’s headlines, by the weather of today,”
she said. “Inevitably, it will be affected by the
climate of the era.”
Samuel Issacharoff, a law professor at New
York University, said the court had played a
traditional and proper role in the case. “The
speed of the shifting societal consensus on
same-sex marriage is astonishing,” he said.
“The court protecting the emerging national
consensus is not.”

A second 5-to-4 decision, allowing Texas to
reject specialty license plates bearing the
Confederate battle flag, was issued the
morning after the shootings in Charleston,
S.C., started a national debate about the
meaning of that symbol. The timing was
coincidence, and the vote was close. The
liberals, as usual, voted as a group — but they
were joined by Justice Thomas in a rare
alliance.
This term may have been an anomaly, and the
next one may shift back to the right. The
justices have already agreed to hear cases on
affirmative action and the meaning of “one
person, one vote,” and they are likely to hear
a major abortion case. Last term, the court
issued unanimous decisions in about twothirds of its case, a modern record. This term,
the number dropped to about 40 percent, a
little lower than the average in recent terms.
But the court remained united in cases
involving religion, issuing unanimous rulings
in favor of a Muslim inmate in an Arkansas
prison who wanted to grow a beard and an
Arizona church that challenged a town
ordinance limiting the size of signs
announcing services.
Business groups had a mixed record, winning
12 of the 22 cases in which they faced
individuals or the government. “This term’s
business decisions should put an end to the
persistent theory that the Roberts court is
reflexively biased in favor of corporate
interests,” said Lauren R. Goldman, a lawyer
with Mayer Brown.
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Moreover, she said, many of the business
victories were narrow. “On the other side of
the ledger,” she said, “the court handed the
business community several substantial
losses.” Among the setbacks, she said, were
victories for plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases and a broad
interpretation of the scope of the Fair
Housing Act

Over all, though, the story of the last nine
months at the Supreme Court was of leftward
movement.
“This term feels just huge,” said Lisa S. Blatt,
a lawyer with Arnold & Porter who has
argued more than 30 cases in the Supreme
Court and studied its work for two decades.
“It’s clearly the most liberal term I’ve seen
since I’ve been watching the court.”
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“Supreme Court’s Liberal Admirers Get Reality Check”
Politico
Josh Gerstein
June 29, 2015
Liberals still giddy over a series of major
victories at the Supreme Court last week got
a bracing reality check Monday, as
conservatives carried the day on key cases
involving the death penalty and President
Barack Obama’s environmental agenda.
Progressives got another signal that any
momentum they were experiencing at the
high court could be short-lived: the justices
announced they will address the thorny issue
of affirmative action next term, taking up for
the second time a case challenging the
University of Texas’s use of race in its
admissions process.

pronouncements “largely premature and
exaggerated.”
Some conservatives agreed that the court
wasn’t necessarily taking a new direction.
“I always thought the claims that the Roberts
court ‘is the most conservative since’
whenever were overblown and I think the
claims of a dramatic leftward turn are
overblown, too,” said Jonathan Adler, a law
professor at Case Western Reserve. “When
you kind of step back and look at the
substance of the cases, what’s at issue and
what the court did, I don’t think you see a
great liberal shift.”

For some, it felt like whiplash.
“The cases today are shocking,” said Nan
Aron, a prominent liberal activist and
president of Alliance for Justice. “Last week
was wonderful and no one can take away the
victories that occurred, but I think it’s also
important to understand those victories in a
context [that] the court is one that continues
to rule in favor of powerful and wealthy
interests at the expense of most Americans.
The decisions certainly today suggest that
trend continues.”
Aron dismissed conclusions that the court
was shifting to the left as it ruled in favor of
same-sex marriage rights and upheld the
nationwide availability of insurance
subsidies under Obamacare, calling such

All three decisions the justices issued
Monday were 5-4 rulings. Justice Anthony
Kennedy voted with the court’s other
Republican appointees to reject a challenge
to Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol,
effectively easing application of the death
penalty nationwide, and to knock back
regulations the Obama administration issued
trying to limit mercury in power plants,
complicating
Obama’s
environmental
policies.
Even the sole case where the court’s liberal
wing prevailed Monday by winning over
Kennedy had a potential downside for the
left. The court’s ruling allowing the
redistricting of congressional seats to be
handled by independent commissions is
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likely a setback to Republicans in Arizona,
which brought the case to the justices, but a
blow to Democrats in the much-larger state
of California.
While Monday’s decisions provided an
important reminder that conservatism is still
alive and well in the Supreme Court’s
chambers, some analysts insisted that the
court’s tilt to the left in the current term was
unmistakable.
“The numbers show that this is easily the
most liberal term of the Roberts Court, and
probably the last couple of decades,”
SCOTUSblog founder and Supreme Court
lawyer Tom Goldstein told POLITICO. “For
all the talk of a conservative bloc, it was the
more liberal Justices who hung together went
it counted.”
Goldstein analyzed 26 cases this term in
which the vote was close (either 6-3 or 5-4)
and seemed to split along ideological lines.
He found the left prevailed in 19 cases, while
the conservatives were victorious in only
seven.
One factor preventing some liberals from
rejoicing about the Supreme Court results
this term is a fear of what’s to come. The
return of affirmative action to the court’s
docket for the next term made some on the
left jittery.
“It does seem ominous,” said Caroline
Fredrickson of the American Constitution
Society. “I’m worried….that the justices
would like to put the nail in the coffin for
affirmative action.”

The court muddied the waters further
Monday afternoon with orders in heated
disputes over abortion restrictions, as well as
contraception-coverage requirements under
Obamacare.
The justices, by a 5-4 vote, blocked
enforcement of a new Texas state law forcing
abortion clinics to upgrade their facilities and
use doctors with admitting privileges at
nearby hospitals. Abortion rights advocates
said about half the clinics in Texas would
have to close under the new rules. Kennedy
joined with the court’s liberals to prevent the
law from taking effect until the Supreme
Court has a chance to consider taking the
case.
The court also issued an order giving the
Catholic archdiocese in Pittsburgh and
several other groups the ability to escape
Obamacare’s
contraceptive
coverage
requirements until the court addresses
whether
exemptions
the
Obama
administration has created for religious
organizations are adequate. Only Justice
Sonia Sotomayor noted a dissent from the
order.
Those moves suggest the court is likely to
weigh in on the polarizing issues of abortion
and Obamacare next term, in addition to the
affirmative action case. The justices also
announced in May that they will hear another
politically sensitive case: a dispute from
Texas over whether election districts must be
drawn to cover equal numbers of voters or
can use a count which includes residents who
don’t vote, such as foreigners, children and
prisoners.
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Also looming as a possible candidate for the
docket next term: a high-stakes legal fight
over whether President Barack Obama’s
executive orders on immigration exceeded
his authority.
While it’s tempting to view the court as tilting
to one side or another, many analysts and
advocates say it isn’t really the court moving,
but the most frequent swing justice —
Anthony Kennedy — coming down on
different sides in different cases. That makes
him a more pivotal figure than even Chief
Justice John Roberts, whose vote is more
reliably conservative.

Just as Kennedy held sway in the three cases
resolved Monday, he could well be the
critical vote in the affirmative action,
abortion, voting rights and immigration
disputes likely to be resolved in the coming
term.
“It’s not the Roberts Court, yet. It’s the
Kennedy Court in many ways,” said
Fredrickson. “He really controls the decision.
The one man, the one vote kind of determines
the decision in almost every big case. It’s an
incredible power.”
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“The Numbers on the Extent to which this was a ‘Liberal’ Supreme
Court Term”
SCOTUSblog
Tom Goldstein
June 29, 2015
There is a lot of commentary about the
unusually liberal results of this Term. I
thought I would mention a few data points
which back up that view of things.
For present purposes, I treat four Justices as
sitting to the Court’s left: Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor,
and Elena Kagan. I treat four Justices as
sitting to the Court’s right: Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. I treat
Justice Anthony Kennedy as the Court’s
“center.”
I count 26 cases this Term that were both
close (5-4 or 6-3) and ideological (in the
sense that they broke down principally on
ideological lines, with ideology seemingly an
important factor).
Of the 26 cases, the left prevailed in 19.
Those included the first 9 of the Term. The
right prevailed in 7.
In the 26, a Justice on the left voted with the
right a total of 3 times. In 2 cases, those votes
determined the outcome and produced a more
conservative result, because Justice Kennedy
or one of the conservatives voted for the more
liberal result.
In the 26, a Justice on the right voted with the
left 14 times. In 6 cases, those votes

determined the outcome and produced a more
liberal result, because Justice Kennedy voted
for the more conservative result.
I also considered the 10 cases I consider most
significant. Of those, the left prevailed in 8.
Those included the first 7 of the Term. (I
mention the early cases to give a sense of how
the results must have appeared inside the
Court as the Term went along.) The right
prevailed in 2, both in the final sitting of the
Term.
In the 10, no Justice on the left voted with the
right; the four Justices on the left voted
together in every one of those cases. A
Justice on the right voted with the left 4 times.
Those votes determined the outcome in 2
cases, because Justice Kennedy voted for the
more conservative result.
Note that the analysis above is skewed
against finding the Term particularly liberal
by treating Justice Kennedy as the Court’s
“center.” That is true ideologically, but he is
certainly a conservative.
If he were
characterized that way for my analysis, the
number of defections to the left would be
much higher.
By that measure, a Justice on the right voted
with the left 25 times (compared with 3 times
the reverse happened). That occurred in all
10 of the 10 major cases (because no Justice
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on the left voted with the right in any of those
cases), and determined the outcome in all of
them.
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“Has the Supreme Court Really Moved Leftward this Term?”
The Washington Post
Jonathan H. Adler
June 25, 2015
Earlier this week the New York Times
proclaimed that the Supreme Court has
“move(d) leftward.” Much like earlier
pronouncements that the Roberts Court was
the most conservative in decades –
particularly those based upon similar types of
analyses, the article’s central claim needs to
be taken with healthy dose of salt.
The central claim of the article is that the
Supreme Court has had one of its most
“liberal” terms since the end of the Warren
Court. This conclusion is based upon an
analysis which finds that the Court has
adopted a “liberal” outcome in 54 percent of
cases that have been decided thus far this
term. Such an analysis, combined with
consideration of the frequency each justice
finds him or herself in the majority, may tell
us which “side” of the court is prevailing
more often this term, but I do not think it tells
us all that much about the trajectory or
tendency of the Court or its jurisprudence.
One immediate problem with this sort of
analysis is that it does not account for the
substance of individual cases and, more
importantly, the effect on underlying
doctrine. That is, this sort of analysis makes
no distinction between a case that shifts the
law in a more conservative or liberal
direction and a decision that maintains the
status quo. Assuming that, at least in some
areas, the current justices are relatively
satisfied with current doctrine, whether a case

is coded as “liberal” or “conservative” will be
solely a function of the judgment under
review.
Another problem with this sort of analysis,
particularly when used to analyze the Court’s
behavior over time, is that it does not account
for shifts in the law. As a consequence, this
sort of analysis can produce conclusions that
are precisely the opposite of what is actually
occurring. That is, if a Court adopts a liberal
holding at one point in time, and then refuses
to extend that holding still further in the
latter, the decision maintaining the
comparatively liberal rule will be coded as a
“conservative” holding, even though all it did
is maintain the status quo.
To illustrate this problem, consider the
Court’s global warming decisions. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, in 2005, the Court
held that the greenhouse gases were
“pollutants” subject to regulation under the
Clean Air Act. This holding dramatically
expanded the EPA’s regulatory authority.
The decision also lowered the bar for
standing in environmental cases for state
litigants, if not more generally. This was
clearly a “liberal” ruling. Several years later,
in American Electric Power v. Connecticut,
the Court held that nuisance suits against
greenhouse gas emitters under federal
common law were displaced by federal
regulatory authority. This holding was a
direct consequence of the Massachusetts v.
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EPA holding, and would have been classified
as a “conservative” ruling.
Taken together, Mass. and AEP would
represent a wash – a liberal decision and a
conservative decision. Yet, as a substantive
matter, the combination is a dramatic shift in
the law in a “liberal” direction. Analyzing
individual votes only magnifies the problem,
as there were 12 votes for the “conservative”
position in the cases combined, while only
five votes for the “liberal” position. The sort
of analysis embodied in the Times article
would suggest that the Mass. Court was more
liberal than the AEP Court, while a
consideration of the actual decisions would
find no change at all. AEP did nothing at all
to scale back the holding of Massachusetts v.
EPA, so the consequence of this “more
conservative” Court was nothing but a
maintenance of the status quo.
Another concern I have with the article is its
uncritical acceptance of the case coding in the
Supreme Court Database. While conceding
that it is “possible to quarrel with the coding
of any individual case,” the article’s authors
claim that “there is relatively little
disagreement about the judgments among
legal scholars, and the coding conventions
are both consistently applied and in line with
most people’s intuitions.” This may be the
view of most political scientists, but it is
hardly a consensus view. Indeed, multiple
analyses of the Supreme Court Database’s
case coding have found widespread instances
of questionable coding, affecting as much as
20 to 30 percent of cases. See, for instance,
the work of Carolyn Shapiro here and here.
Indeed, the problems are bad enough that

some scholars who heavily relied upon the
database in the past have recoded cases for
more recent analyses (such as this one, which
was also the subject of a Times story and
discussed here).
While the coding of most contemporary cases
is unlikely to be controversial (save for those
where the Court splits along untraditional
lines), the lack of consistent or reliable
coding in the database limits the usefulness
of historical analyses. This is particularly so
given evidence that some coding may have
been the result of confirmation bias, such that
coding of some cases may have reflected
coder expectations about the Court’s
behavior in a given term as much as the actual
merits of the case.
Another concern I have, acknowledged in the
piece, is the focus on a single term. Given the
relatively small number of cases the Court
hears each term, no single term is particularly
representative of the Court’s work as a
whole. Thus it is inevitable that some terms
appear more “liberal” or “conservative” than
others because few, if any, terms contain a
fully representative sample of the sorts of
issues the Court is called upon to address.
This term, for example, despite the heavy
roster of high profile cases, still did not
include cases in many areas that regularly
divide the justices along ideological lines,
such as abortion.
If we really want to know whether the Court
is more liberal or conservative than it has
been in the past – whether in terms of its
trajectory or its performance in a given term
– we need to do more than code each case as
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“liberal” or “conservative” and tabulate the
results. Instead we must look at the substance
of the Court’s decisions to see whether it is
moving the law in one direction or another –
whether expanding gay rights and limiting
the death penalty or constraining federal
power and reducing protections for criminal
defendants.
In the past I’ve argued that a substantive
analysis of the Roberts Court suggests that it
is a generally a “conservative minimalist”
court. That is, the modal behavior of this
Court is to move the law slowly, but
perceptibly, in a rightward direction, while

maintaining a fairly heavy status-quo bias.
There are exceptions, however, as there are
areas in which the Court’s shift have not been
minor (the protection of campaign-related
speech) and still others where the Court has
moved the law in a more liberal direction
(gay rights and habeas rights for detainees).
Further, in some areas in which the Court has
shifted Right, such as abortion, it appears to
have brought us back to where the Court had
been in the early years of the Rehnquist
Court. The Court may be more conservative
than the Warren and Burger Courts, but it is
doing very little to undo most Warren and
Burger Court precedents.
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“A Fractious Majority”
Slate
Eric Posner
June 30, 2015
In 2010, the New York Times’ Supreme Court
reporter, Adam Liptak, wrote an article
entitled “Court Under Roberts Is Most
Conservative in Decades.” He noted that in
its first five years, Chief Justice John
Roberts’ court had rendered conservative
decisions 58 percent of the time, and in the
2008 term 65 percent, the highest rate in a
half-century. The court was “the most
conservative one in living memory.”
Republicans, who have been trying to move
the court to the right since Nixon was
president, finally had put into place a rocksolid conservative majority.
On Monday, Liptak and some co-authors
published another article, this one entitled
“The Roberts Court’s Surprising Move
Leftward.” It turns out that the most recent
term will be the most liberal since 1969, with
liberal decisions accounting for 56 percent of
the cases, according to the article. Liberal
decisions outnumber conservative decisions
over each of the past three years, the first time

that has happened since the 1960s. What
happened?
Liberals credit—and conservatives blame—
Republican-appointed Justice Anthony
Kennedy for frequently crossing the line and
voting for liberal outcomes. It was Kennedy
who wrote Obergefell v. Hodges, the opinion
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage.
However, Kennedy has been Kennedy since
he was appointed in 1988. He has written
opinions friendly to gay rights since 2003.
Kennedy himself can’t explain a trend.
What does seem to be new, however, is that
the Republican appointees on the court have
found it increasingly difficult to form a united
front against the Democratic appointees. The
chart below shows that in the term that just
concluded, this trend of disagreement among
conservatives accelerated.
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The chart shows the percentage of cases in
which conservative justices agree with other
conservatives, and liberal justices agree with
other liberals. The liberals vote with one
another more than 90 percent of the time
while the conservatives vote with one another
about 70–80 percent of the time. While I lack
Frank Luntz’s talent for political wordplay, I
humbly submit to right-wing operatives that
they should call the Democratic appointees
“lockstep liberals” because of their bloc
voting.
You can also see this pattern in the justices’
decision writing. Most of the justices wrote
six or seven majority opinions over the term.
But there is wide variation in their propensity
to write separate concurrences or dissents.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote three separate
opinions; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote
six; Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen
Breyer wrote eight each. Roberts and
Kennedy also wrote very few. By contrast,
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote 26, Justice
Clarence Thomas wrote 25, and Justice
Samuel Alito wrote 20.
Minorities can exercise surprising power
when they exercise discipline in voting. A
fractious majority—here the five Republican
appointees—will find themselves on the
losing side again and again if one of their own
temporarily defects to the other side because
of a strongly felt position on an obscure point
of law.
Why can’t the Republican majority exercise
more discipline? One possible explanation is
ideological disagreement. Mirroring the
Republican Party, the Republican justices
divide between social conservatives (Scalia,

Thomas, probably Alito, and possibly
Roberts) and a libertarian, Kennedy, who
often casts his vote with the liberal bloc.
Of all the justices, Kennedy is the most
frequently ridiculed.
As the court moved right during the first half
of Roberts’ tenure, conservative litigants may
have spotted the opportunity to obtain
favorable decisions. To do so, they needed to
challenge laws and precedents that in the past
would have been secure. It is possible they
overreached by bringing challenges that were
more extreme than all five of the conservative
justices could stomach, exposing the latent
ideological fissures that existed between
them.
Another explanation is jurisprudential
disagreement. Here the division is between
formalists (Scalia and Thomas) and
pragmatists (Roberts, Alito, and Kennedy).
The formalists interpret the Constitution
based on its original meaning and read
statutes narrowly rather than expansively (or
claim to). Originalism usually generates
conservative
outcomes
because
the
th
Constitution reflects mostly 18 - and 19thcentury values. Narrow interpretation of
legislation—as illustrated by Scalia’s dissent
in King v. Burwell, which would have
invalidated a key element of Obamacare
based on a narrow interpretation of some of
its language—tends to favor conservative
outcomes because legislation usually
expands government control. But not always,
with the result that Scalia and Thomas
sometimes come down in a liberal direction.
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The pragmatists, by contrast, put more
weight
on
precedent
and
usually
unarticulated extra-legal factors. It is widely
thought that Roberts, for example, has voted,
twice now, to uphold Obamacare against
challenges from the right because he believes
that the obliteration of a major piece of
legislation by an ideologically predictable 5–
4 vote would deal a blow to the court’s
credibility. Nearly everyone thinks that
Kennedy has followed public opinion on gay
marriage. Whatever his personal views, he
would not have found a right to same-sex
marriage in 1988, when it was anathema to
both parties and a majority of Americans. His
talentless writing style, replete with cheesy
Hallmark-card sentimentality, sets the teeth
of the other conservatives on edge, but it
reflects
a
distinctive
jurisprudential
sensibility that he has stubbornly held to,
though no one can figure out what it is.
The conservative justices also disagree with
one another in more subtle ways. In King v.
Burwell, Roberts and Kennedy rejected the
narrow interpretation of the statute advanced
by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. In Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, a case decided earlier this month,
Thomas split with the other conservatives on
the breadth of the president’s power to
control information put in passports. In
Johnson v. United States, a case decided on
Friday, Alito dissented alone as the other
justices struck down a federal statute that
enhanced sentences of people who had earlier
been convicted of “violent felonies.” The
other justices thought the term was
unconstitutionally vague; Alito thought its
definition could be narrowed. In all these
cases, the liberals voted with the majority and
kept mum.

While partisan heterodoxy among the
Republicans has grown in recent years, it is
not new. Republican appointees John Paul
Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, and David
Souter all crossed party lines to vote with
Democratic appointees on some of the most
important issues of the day (abortion,
campaign finance, rights of criminal
defendants). By contrast, it’s hard to think of
significant examples of liberal justices doing
the same. Their loyalty to the party line is
virtually unbroken.
I wish I could explain this asymmetry, but I
can’t. A common explanation offered by
disgruntled conservatives—that spineless
justices newly arrived from the provinces
want to bask in the approval of the liberal
media in D.C.—strikes me as pretty
implausible. Liberals will never trust
Kennedy—remember that he voted to strike
down Obamacare three years ago. In a
polarized environment, no one respects
moderates, even if they can sometimes be
made use of. Of all the justices, Kennedy is
the most frequently ridiculed. No one seems
to admire him for his independence of mind.
Conservatives might be tempted to think that
the Republican-appointed justices disagree
so often, and write so frequently, because
they take the law seriously while the liberals
care only about pleasing the party base. If this
is true, however, conservatives might wonder
whether they are being well served by their
justices. Our society has assigned legislative
power to the Supreme Court, authorizing it to
settle the hardest political questions by fiat.
Gay marriage and Obamacare are now
unshakable political facts in America, and
will remain so long after the jurisprudential
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debates among the conservatives have been
forgotten.
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“Why is John Roberts Siding with the Supreme Court’s Liberals?”
Slate
Adam Winkler
June 11, 2015
John Roberts has changed. Consider the chief
justice’s voting record. From 2005—the year
he was appointed—until 2012—the year of
the first Affordable Care Act decision—
Roberts was a reliable vote on the court’s
staunch conservative wing. In controversies
from abortion to campaign finance to guns,
Roberts sided with Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and
Anthony Kennedy. The 2012 health care case
was only the second time Roberts had ever
voted with the liberal side of the court in a 5–
4 decision.* Lately, however, we’re seeing a
very different Roberts. Last term Roberts
surprised many by breaking left on a few
major cases. And so far this term, Roberts has
voted with Stephen Breyer (90 percent), Ruth
Bader Ginsburg (85 percent), and Sonia
Sotomayor (83 percent) more often than he
has joined Thomas (66 percent), Kennedy (74
percent), and Alito (77 percent). And that
isn’t just on minor cases. He’s recently sided
with the liberals in cases on issues that
typically divide the court along ideological
lines, including campaign finance and antidiscrimination law.
Little wonder then that some conservatives
ask if Roberts is “going wobbly.” While court
watchers have recognized and speculated
over Roberts’ shift to the left, the reason for
the shift remains obscure. Beyond
amorphous notions of Roberts’ special
concerns for his “legacy” or the court’s
“legitimacy,” what accounts for Roberts’

recent move to moderation? Only he truly
knows the answer, but one possibility is that
Roberts has learned something from his time
on the bench. In particular, his transformation
might have been influenced by two specific
cases: one high-profile, the other largely
forgotten.
Few Supreme Court decisions have sparked
more controversy and subjected the court to
more widespread criticism than its 2010
ruling in the campaign finance reform case
Citizens United. The court’s 5–4 decision,
with Roberts in the majority, held that
corporations and unions have a First
Amendment right to spend unlimited
amounts of money to influence elections. The
decision put the court at the very epicenter of
political debate—precisely the place Roberts
said he wanted to avoid during his
confirmation hearings. The ruling, which
many believe benefits the GOP, has been
seen as partisan; almost no one sees Citizens
United as simply a matter of balls and strikes.
It was also anything but the kind of small,
incremental steps Roberts claimed to prefer
when altering existing doctrine.
Some conservatives ask if Roberts is “going
wobbly.”
If one wanted an explanation for why Roberts
changed his vote in the first Affordable Care
Act case in 2012, Citizens United would be a
good place to start. According to Jeffrey
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Toobin, Citizens United was “orchestrated”
by Roberts. Yet the opposite is likely true.
Roberts preferred a narrow ruling in Citizens
United but was persuaded by his conservative
colleagues to join a very broad, precedentreversing decision that radically shifted the
terrain of campaign finance law. The country,
across political lines, was angry. And two
years later the Affordable Care Act case
looked like a repeat performance: The chief
justice sought a narrow ruling voiding the
individual mandate while his conservative
colleagues pushed for a more aggressive
ruling that would overturn the whole law,
including the hundreds of provisions on
issues that didn’t relate in any way to the
constitutionality of the mandate. As reporting
at the time revealed, on the eve of a
presidential election that promised to make
the court’s decision the biggest issue in the
campaign, Roberts seemingly balked. He
wasn’t following his friends down the rabbit
hole again.
Roberts may also have learned a similar,
valuable lesson from a far less familiar
ruling: House v. Bell, from Roberts’ very first
term on the court. Few remember the facts of
this case—Paul House, a man sentenced to
death, won the right to file a habeas petition
in federal court—but you can bet Roberts will
never forget it. Joined by Scalia and Thomas,
Roberts wrote a partial dissent that
contemptuously dismissed House’s claims of
innocence.* To House’s contention that his
scratches and bruises were from his
construction work and a cat’s claws, Roberts
derisively replied, “Scratches from a cat,
indeed.” Several years later, however,
prosecutors dropped all charges against

House, who was exonerated by DNA
evidence.
House is the type of case that should cause
any justice to second-guess his or her own
intuitions and judgments. Certainly it offered
Roberts an object lesson in the perils of
judicial overconfidence: Don’t be so certain
you are right even when you are certain you
are right. On some issues, like voting rights,
Roberts’ views may be so longstanding and
firmly held as to be immune to moderation.
And some of his seemingly liberal votes may
be strategic, part of what legal scholar and
Slate contributor Richard Hasen calls
Roberts’ “long game.” Yet somehow the
spirit of compromise, if not the ghost of Paul
House, haunts the chief justice’s chambers.
No one doubts that Roberts leans right
jurisprudentially. Yet over the past two
terms, we’ve seen evidence that Roberts has
become a bit more circumspect of his own
jurisprudential views and perhaps more wary
of those of his conservative colleagues.
Carrie Severino of the right-leaning Judicial
Crisis Network says, “There certainly seems
like a more consistent pattern on the part of
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito of being really
conservative to the core.” In this way, we
might see the conservative wing of the court
in a similar light as the intramural wars
plaguing the Republican party in general:
Mainstream conservatives find themselves
trying to fight off the more radical, burndown-the-house Tea Partiers. Some on the
court seem less interested in incremental
steps than infernos.
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Of course, there are two major decisions yet
to come this term that will color any analysis
of Roberts for years, if not decades, to come:
King v. Burwell, on the availability of
subsidies on the federally created health care
exchanges, and Obergefell v. Hodges, on the
right of same-sex couples to marry. No one

outside the court knows how those cases will
come out, but don’t be surprised if once again
Roberts
defects
from
the
Scalia/Thomas/Alito wing. By now he’s
learned to watch out for where his friends
might take him.
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“A Liberal But Restrained Supreme Court Term”
Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
June 30, 2015
The Supreme Court in the just-completed
term passed up a number of opportunities to
upend existing law, including the Affordable
Care Act.
In areas including civil rights, employment
discrimination and voting-rights laws, the
justices rejected conservative-backed legal
efforts to push the court’s precedents to the
right. In cases that divided the court, it at
times reached liberal conclusions as one or
more conservatives—typically swing Justice
Anthony Kennedy—sided with the court’s
four liberal justices. The term’s record shows
that the liberal justices stuck together with a
consistency the court’s conservatives didn’t
match, including in last week’s landmark
rulings on same-sex marriage and health care.
The term’s dynamic showed a reluctance of
the John Roberts court, where Republican
appointees hold the majority, to upend the
status quo. That reticence stands in contrast
to rulings in recent years, when issues such as
campaign finance brought conservatives
together to overturn precedent.
“The chief justice really does take restraint
seriously,” said University of Michigan
political scientist Andrew Martin, who helps
run the Supreme Court Database that
provides quantitative analysis of the justices
and their decisions. “At times, that is going to
put a justice in contraposition to what his
ideological preferences might be.”

“Lawyers overwhelmingly are raised in an
environment where stability is valued,
change is complicated,” said Stanford law
professor Mark Kelman. Switching direction
is “always more complex than whether you
would have enacted it in the first place.”
The court’s hesitation to strike down existing
laws was evident in several cases.
It left in place a legal tool for enforcing the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 that allows housing
lawsuits without proof of intentional
discrimination against minorities, in a 5-4
ruling in which maverick conservative
Justice Kennedy joined liberal Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
Conservatives and businesses for years have
been trying to rein in housing lawsuits that
use the legal doctrine, known as disparate
impact.
Twice since 2011 the court had agreed to
consider whether such cases could proceed,
only to see them vanish when the parties
settled or dropped appeals. This year, the
justices finally had their chance, in a Texas
case—and it voted to leave disparate impact
intact.
“Residents and policy makers have come to
rely on the availability of disparate-impact
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claims,” Justice Kennedy wrote in the
majority opinion.
In two voting-rights cases, majorities formed
by the liberal wing and Justice Kennedy left
in place mechanisms that aim to make
political voting districts less partisan and
fairer for minorities.
In a case from Arizona, the court said states
could establish independent panels to draw
electoral maps. In an Alabama case, it held
that the Voting Rights Act allows challenges
to political maps that allegedly dilute
minority political strength by concentrating
such voters in a handful of districts.
Justice Kennedy’s votes with the court’s
liberals are a major factor in their success.
But another conservative justice, Chief
Justice Roberts, wrote the majority opinion
rejecting a conservative-backed lawsuit that
would have gutted the Affordable Care Act.
He was joined by the liberal bloc and Justice
Kennedy.
Beneath such broad trends, the term did
reveal areas of consensus among the justices.
For one, the court showed a concern for
individual religious expression that crossed
ideological lines. It ruled unanimously, or
nearly so, for Muslims who complained
about religious discrimination, one an inmate
who prison authorities forbid from growing a
short beard, another an Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. job applicant who was rejected for
wearing a head scarf.

The court also appeared to share a growing
bipartisan concern over harsh criminal laws,
siding in several cases with criminal
defendants who argued that prosecutors had
overreached.
A Supreme Court decision makes gay
marriage legal in all 50 states. What
constitutional principles did the court’s
majority apply, and what are the
implications? WSJ’s Jason Bellini has
#TheShortAnswer.
On Friday, for instance, an 8-1 court found
that a federal “three-strikes” law was written
too vaguely to be constitutional, giving
prosecutors too much discretion to lengthen
sentences by invoking prior convictions for
undefined violent crimes.
A surprise winner this term was the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, an
agency whose legal positions historically
have received little deference from the
Supreme Court. The commission prevailed in
all three cases it was involved in, ranging
from the rejected Muslim job applicant to
pregnancy discrimination to the efforts it
must make to informally resolve disputes
before suing an employer.
Those cases, too, can be considered statusquo rulings, said University of Colorado law
professor Melissa Hart. The two cases
involved “employers taking very aggressive
positions about the limits of EEOC authority
and the reach of federal employment
discrimination law,” she said. The decisions
are “less about any change in the court’s
attitude toward the EEOC and more about the
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kinds of arguments being made in lower
courts.”

person-one-vote rule, and public-employee
collective bargaining rights.

There is no guarantee the current dynamic
will persist into the court’s next term, which
begins in October. The justices have agreed
to hear several cases in which right-leaning
activists seek to overrule or limit precedents
that protect affirmative action, the one-

By placing such cases on the docket—a move
that takes four anonymous votes—the court’s
conservatives are signaling their openness to
arguments calling for major changes in the
law.
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“The Polarized Court”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
May 10, 2014
When the Supreme Court issued its latest
campaign finance decision last month, the
justices lined up in a familiar way. The five
appointed by Republican presidents voted for
the Republican National Committee, which
was a plaintiff. The four appointed by
Democrats dissented.
That 5-to-4 split along partisan lines was by
contemporary standards unremarkable. But
by historical standards it was extraordinary.
For the first time, the Supreme Court is
closely divided along party lines.
The partisan polarization on the court reflects
similarly deep divisions in Congress, the
electorate and the elite circles in which the
justices move.
The deep and often angry divisions among
the justices are but a distilled version of the
way American intellectuals — at think tanks
and universities, in opinion journals and
among the theorists and practitioners of law
and politics — have separated into two
groups with vanishingly little overlap or
interaction. It is a recipe for dysfunction.
The perception that partisan politics has
infected the court’s work may do lasting
damage to its prestige and authority and to
Americans’ faith in the rule of law.
“An undesirable consequence of the court’s
partisan divide,” said Justin Driver, a law

professor at the University of Texas, “is that
it becomes increasingly difficult to contend
with a straight face that constitutional law is
not simply politics by other means, and that
justices are not merely politicians clad in fine
robes. If that perception becomes pervasive
among today’s law students, who will
become tomorrow’s judges, after all, it could
assume a self-reinforcing quality.”
Presidents used to make nominations based
on legal ability, to cater to religious or ethnic
groups, to repay political favors or to reward
friends. Even when ideology was their main
concern, they often bet wrong.
Three changes have created a courthouse
made up of red and blue chambers. Presidents
care more about ideology than they once did.
They have become better at finding nominees
who reliably vote according to that ideology.
And party affiliation is increasingly the best
way to predict the views of everyone from
justices to bank tellers.
It tells you more than gender, age, race or
class, a 2012 Pew Research Center study
found. And the gap between the parties is
now larger than at any time in the survey’s
25-year history.
“Polarization is higher than at any time I’ve
ever seen as a citizen or studied as a student
of politics,” said Kay L. Schlozman, a
political scientist at Boston College.
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Supreme Court nominations were never
immune from political considerations. But
many factors used to play a role.
That is why Republican presidents routinely
appointed justices who were or would turn
out to be liberals. Among them were Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justices William J.
Brennan Jr. and Harry A. Blackmun.
But it has been almost 25 years since the last
such appointment, of Justice David H. Souter
in 1990. And it has been more than 50 years
since a Democratic president last appointed a
justice who often voted with the court’s
conservatives: Justice Byron R. White, who
was nominated by President John F. Kennedy
in 1962.
That timeline may suggest more ideological
rigidity among Democratic presidents. But
the number of opportunities played a role,
too, as there have been twice as many
Republican appointments since 1953. And
Republican justices were until recently more
apt than Democratic ones to drift away from
the positions of the presidents who appointed
them.
The new era arrived with the last retirement,
in 2010. Justice John Paul Stevens, a liberal
appointed by President Gerald R. Ford, a
Republican, left the court. Justice Elena
Kagan, a liberal appointed by President
Obama, arrived.
Now, just as there is no Democratic senator
who is more conservative than the most
liberal Republican, there is no Democratic
appointee on the Supreme Court who is more

conservative than any Republican appointee.
“It’s not coincidence,” said Lawrence Baum,
a political scientist at Ohio State, “that the
court is now divided along partisan lines in a
way that hasn’t been true.”
The partisan split is likely to deepen, said
Neal Devins, a law professor at William &
Mary and an author, along with Professor
Baum, of a study examining, as its subtitle
put it, “how party polarization turned the
Supreme Court into a partisan court.”
Consider, Professor Devins said, the eventual
retirement of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a
Republican appointee who sits at the court’s
ideological center and joins the court’s fourmember liberal wing about a third of the time
when it divides along partisan lines.
“When Kennedy leaves,” Professor Devins
said, “it’s going to move the court a whole,
whole lot to the left, if the president is a
Democrat, or slightly to the right, if it’s a
Republican.”
THESE days, candidates for the court are
groomed for decades and subjected to intense
vetting. They are often affiliated with the
networks of conservative or liberal lawyers
that have replaced more neutral groups like
bar associations. And they are drawn more
than ever from federal appeals courts, where
their views can be closely scrutinized.
Confirmation battles have grown more
partisan. With the exception of Justice
Clarence Thomas, the five most senior
members of the current court were confirmed
easily, receiving an average of three negative
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votes. The four more recent nominees
received an average of 33.
Once on the court, the justices surround
themselves with like-minded law clerks,
consume news reports that reinforce their
views and appear before sympathetic
audiences.
In their public statements, the justices reject
the idea that their work is influenced by
politics. They point out that their decisions
were unanimous almost half the time in the
term that ended in June 2013, and that the
roughly 30 percent of 5-to-4 decisions did not
all feature the classic alignments of Justice
Kennedy joining either the court’s
conservative wing or its liberal one.
But that was how most of the closely divided
decisions came out. The conservatives won
10 times, including a decision striking down
a core provision of the Voting Rights Act.
The liberals won six times, including a ruling
requiring the federal government to provide
benefits to married same-sex couples.
There are notable exceptions, of course,
starting with Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr.'s 2012 vote to uphold the heart of the
Affordable Care Act.
But standard political-science measurements
of ideology, based on many thousands of
votes, confirm the rise of a court divided on
partisan lines.
The very question of partisan voting hardly
arose until 1937, as dissents on the Supreme
Court were infrequent. When the justices did
divide, it was seldom along party lines.

There is room for interpretation in such
assessments. But of the 71 cases from 1790
to 1937 deemed important by a standard
reference work and in which there were at
least two dissenting votes, only one broke by
party affiliation. “The dividing line in the
court was not a party line,” Zechariah Chafee,
a law professor at Harvard, wrote in a classic
1941 book.
Nonpartisan voting patterns held true until
2010, with a brief exception in the early
1940s, when a lone Republican appointee
voted to the right of eight Democratic
appointees. But the general trend was the
same. Of the 311 cases listed as important
from 1937 to 2010 with at least two dissents,
only one of them, in 1985, even arguably
broke along party lines.
That adds up to two cases in more than two
centuries. By contrast, in just the last three
terms, there were five major decisions that
were closely divided along partisan lines: the
ones on the Voting Rights Act, campaign
finance, arbitration, immigration and stripsearches. In the current term, last month’s
campaign finance ruling and Monday’s
decision on legislative prayer fit the pattern,
too.
MANY factors seem to contribute to partisan
polarization on the court, including the
people who work most closely with the
justices.
Every year, the justices each hire four recent
law students, mostly from a handful of elite
law schools. They consider grades,

43

recommendations and, in recent years, a
political marker.
In the last nine terms, the court’s current
Republican appointees hired clerks who had
first served for appeals court judges
appointed by Republicans at least 83 percent
of the time. Justice Thomas hired one clerk
from a Democratic judge’s chambers, Justice
Scalia none.
The numbers on the other side are almost as
striking. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia
Sotomayor and Kagan hired from
Democratic chambers more than two-thirds
of the time. Justice Stephen G. Breyer is the
exception: His hiring has long been about
evenly divided.
When law clerks move on, their career paths
seem subject to the gravitational pull of
ideology. Clerks for justices appointed by
Democrats
work
for
Democratic
administrations, law firm practices headed by
former Democratic officials and law schools
dominated by liberals. Clerks for Republican
appointees often go in the opposite
directions.
All of this is new, according to a detailed
study in the Vanderbilt Law Review. “The
Supreme Court clerkship appeared to be a
nonpartisan institution from the 1940s into
the 1980s,” it said.
Like the rest of the country, the justices
increasingly rely on sources of information
that reinforce their views.

“We just get The Wall Street Journal and The
Washington Times,” Justice Scalia told New
York magazine in September. He canceled
his subscription to The Washington Post, he
said, because it was “slanted and often nasty”
and “shrilly liberal.” He said he did not read
The New York Times either.
“I get most of my news, probably, driving
back and forth to work, on the radio,” he said.
“Talk guys, usually.”
Before the political and social culture of
Washington grew polarized, most of the
justices moved in a mixed and often liberal
milieu. “The social atmosphere in
Washington had a role in the leftward
movement of some of the justices,” Professor
Baum said.
Those days are over, Justice Scalia said.
“When I was first in Washington, and even in
my early years on this court, I used to go to a
lot of dinner parties at which there were
people from both sides,” he said. “Katharine
Graham used to have dinner parties that
really were quite representative of
Washington. It doesn’t happen anymore.”
In a recent 10-year period, the justices made
around 1,000 public appearances for which
their expenses were reimbursed, which
generally means they were outside
Washington. They almost certainly made at
least as many local appearances. But their
audiences varied. Justices Scalia, Thomas
and Samuel A. Alito Jr. have addressed the
Federalist Society, a conservative group,
while Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer
spoke to the American Constitution Society,
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a liberal group. Justice Sotomayor is a
featured speaker at its national convention
next month.
Justice Kagan, appearing before the
Federalist Society in 2005 when she was dean
of the Harvard Law School, said she admired
its work. But, she added, “you are not my
people.”
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“Polar

Vision”

The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
May 28, 2014
Almost any commentary on the Supreme
Court these days will include an observation
about how polarized the court is: how for the
first time in history, all the Republicanappointed justices (there are five) are to the
right of all the Democratic appointees, and
how the two groups diverge (Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy occasionally excepted) in many
of the court’s most ideologically charged
cases.
True enough. The usual implication is that
this is a problem for the Roberts court. A
recent article by a law professor and a
political scientist, Neal Devins and Lawrence
Baum, predicts that political polarization on
the court is here to stay, and they offer a
compelling exploration of its origins and
current context. Justice Stephen G. Breyer
worried aloud in remarks at the annual
meeting of the American Law Institute in
Washington last week that members of the
court were being viewed as “junior varsity
politicians.”
Justice Breyer’s concern is well founded. But
the problem goes deeper than the court’s
rapidly escalating reputation for partisanship.
In fact, the current emphasis on voting
patterns obscures rather than illuminates the
real problem with the Roberts court: what the
court is actually doing. I mean what it’s doing
substantively: which cases it chooses to
decide, and the decisions it reaches.

It’s tempting for commentators, including
journalists and some scholars, to stay on the
safe side by talking about process rather than
substance. Voting patterns can be displayed
on a chart, and no one can question the
author’s accuracy or motives. On the other
hand, to argue that the Roberts court is
hurtling down the wrong path substantively is
to make a judgment call that invites pushback
and debate. I understand that. This is an
opinion column, and here is my opinion: the
court’s majority is driving it into dangerous
territory. The problem is not only that the
court is too often divided but that it’s too
often simply wrong: wrong in the battles it
picks, wrong in setting an agenda that mimics
a Republican Party platform, wrong in
refusing to give the political system breathing
room to make fundamental choices of selfgovernance.
I don’t relish connecting these dots; I have
sometimes felt like the last person standing
who still insisted, even after living through
Bush v. Gore, that law and not politics is what
drives the Supreme Court. In the newsroom
of The Times, I lobbied periodically against
the routine journalistic practice of identifying
judges by the president who appointed them.
But I’m finding it impossible to avoid the
conclusion that the Republican-appointed
majority is committed to harnessing the
Supreme Court to an ideological agenda. The
evidence is everywhere: from the way the
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court invited and then accepted a
fundamental challenge to public employee
labor unions in Harris v. Quinn, a case argued
in January and due for decision any day; to its
brick-by-brick deregulation of campaign
finance; to its obsession with race and with
drawing the final curtain on the civil rights
revolution.
I wrote “ideological” rather than “partisan”
agenda because there’s something deeper
going on than mere partisanship. Congress,
after all, reauthorized the Voting Rights Act
in 2006 by overwhelming bipartisan
majorities in both houses, in a bill signed into
law by President George W. Bush. The Bush
administration urged the court to uphold the
law in one of the last briefs filed before the
president left office. It was a small cadre of
right-wing activists that pressed the opposing
view on the court. Success took a while: The
court lost its nerve on that initial round in
2009, but conspicuously kept the door open
for a renewed challenge. The result was last
term’s Shelby County v. Holder, the 5-to-4
decision that cut the heart out of the Voting
Rights Act – which had been the plan all
along.
Then there is campaign finance, which didn’t
use to be a specifically partisan issue. Senator
John McCain of the 2002 McCain-Feingold
law, Congress’s most recent attempt to curb
the flow of money into politics, is, after all, a
prominent Republican. The court upheld the
law in 2003 with three Republican-appointed
justices, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O’Connor and David H. Souter, joining the
5-to-4 majority.

The public was not exactly clamoring to do
away with campaign finance regulation, but
the Roberts court set about that project almost
as soon as Justice O’Connor’s retirement in
early 2006, and her replacement by Samuel
A. Alito Jr. cleared the way. The majority’s
most recent achievement was last month’s
McCutcheon decision, abolishing aggregate
limits for direct contributions to candidates in
federal elections. In the 5-to-4 decision this
time, there was no party crossover.
Nor was there any crossover in the Town of
Greece decision earlier this month,
authorizing sectarian invocations at local
government meetings. Opening the doors to
greater public expression and observance of
religion is another central part of the Roberts
court’s project. Here, the court has moved a
bit more slowly. Three years ago, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
invalidated the practice of public prayer at
county board meetings in Forsyth County,
N.C. Local clergy members were offering
prayers that just happened to be laden with
Christian references. The Supreme Court
declined to hear the county’s appeal.
But the pause was just temporary. The Town
of Greece case didn’t differ from the North
Carolina case in any meaningful way. The
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit had found the steady diet of
Christian prayer at town board meetings to be
an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
This time, the justices agreed to hear the
appeal. Since it was obvious that the
majority’s goal was to overturn the Second
Circuit’s decision, it was no great surprise
that the 5-to-4 opinion did so.
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But Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the court
was startling nonetheless for its obliviousness
to the impact that sectarian prayers can have
on those citizens for whom prayer before a
government meeting is not “a benign
acknowledgment of religion’s role in
society” (to quote the opinion) but an affront.
“Adults often encounter speech they find
disagreeable,” Justice Kennedy said
dismissively. This from a justice who in his
majority opinion in a Florida death penalty
case on Tuesday emphasized the right of a
convicted murderer to be treated with
“dignity” by having his intellectual deficit
assessed
meaningfully
rather
than
mechanically. The Constitution’s “protection
of dignity reflects the Nation we have been,
the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire
to be,” Justice Kennedy wrote on Tuesday,
overturning a death sentence. I was left to
wonder about the dignity of the two women
who sued Greece, N.Y., on the claim that the
price of conducting their business with the
town board should not include having to
listen to Christian prayers.
The country didn’t need to have the religious
culture wars reignited, but thanks to the court,
that’s where we now are. Alliance Defending
Freedom, the Christian-right group that
represented the victorious town, has taken out
newspaper ads praising the decision’s “farreaching implications” and offering its
“model prayer policy” that people can press
on their local governments. The Supreme
Court’s “O.K. to pray” is being quickly and
unsubtly turned into a right to pray. The
Alliance’s reference to a “long-standing,
important tradition of public prayer” isn’t

accurate, at least as to its client; the Greece
town board observed only a moment of silent
prayer until 1999, when for unexplained
reasons, the board started inviting local
ministers to pray out loud.
It’s impossible to talk about the Roberts court
without coming back to race. The majority
just can’t leave it alone. Last term, in addition
to the Voting Rights Act case, the court
reached out in Fisher v. University of Texas
to review the affirmative action admissions
plan at the flagship Austin campus. The
university’s Regents, who not too many
decades ago presided over a segregated
system, have been trying their best to
navigate the shifting tides of affirmative
action and find a way to achieve diversity not
only in the aggregate, but in the university’s
classrooms and across its fields of study.
The majority’s effort to ride the Fisher case
into the sunset of affirmative action failed
because the case was such a manifestly poor
vehicle. It was moot by any objective
measure, the recruited plaintiff having
already graduated from another university
before the court even accepted the case. And
the Texas admissions plan is so unusual –
guaranteeing admission to the top 10 percent
of every graduating high school class while
also engaging in some racially conscious
tailoring for about one seat out of five – that
any opinion would be likely to have only a
limited effect elsewhere. So the court was left
to nibble around the edges, ultimately
sending the case back to the lower court for
another look. Its appetite unfulfilled, the
Supreme Court will be back for more. (The
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vote in the Fisher case was 7 to 1; it’s easy to
depolarize when you’re deciding very little.)
Professors Devins and Baum, in their article
on partisanship at the Supreme Court, argue
that the current dynamic is a predictable, even
inevitable reflection of extreme polarization
in our politics. I don’t think they’re wrong,
but it occurs to me to wonder if the flow
might also be running in the other direction. I
wonder whether the Supreme Court itself has
become an engine of polarization, keeping
old culture-war battles alive and forcing to
the surface old conflicts that people were
managing to live with. Suppose, in other
words, that instead of blaming our politics for
giving us the court we have, we should place
on the court at least some of the blame for our
politics.
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